Prologue

From Virtues to Values

The discussion of "values" has become so commonplace in the last few years that one may well forget how recent it all is. It started in England in the election campaign of 1983, when an interviewer of Margaret Thatcher observed, rather derisively, that she seemed to be approving of "Victorian values"—to which Mrs. Thatcher enthusiastically agreed: "Oh exactly. Very much so. Those were the values when our country became great."[1]

"Victorian values" promptly captured the headlines and became an election issue, with many journalists, professors, and Labour Party members frankly contemptuous of so retrograde a notion. Mrs. Thatcher herself was undaunted. One historian later explained that she had stumbled on the expression "by accident, conjuring the phrase out of nowhere, and launching it on its public career."[2] However she came to it, she happily exploited it. In the course of another interview, she explained that she was grateful to have been brought up by a Victorian grandmother who taught her those "Victorian values."

> We were taught to work jolly hard. We were taught to prove yourself; we were taught self-reliance; we were taught to live within our income. You were taught that cleanliness is next to godliness. You were taught self-respect. You were taught always to give a hand to your neighbour. You were taught tremendous pride in your country. All of these things are Victorian values. They are also perennial values.[3]

Almost a decade later, in another election campaign, the term "family values" was introduced into the American vocabulary. Used first by the Republicans, it became a bipartisan slogan the following year, when President Clinton, on the anniversary of his election, spoke in the church in Tennessee where Martin Luther King, Jr., had delivered his last sermon. Inspired by the place and the occasion, he made one of the most eloquent speeches of his presidency. What would King have said, he asked, had he lived to see this day?

> He would say, I did not live and die to see the American family destroyed. I did not live and die to see thirteen-year-old boys get automatic weapons and gun down nine-year-olds just for the kick of it. I did not live and die to see young people destroy their lives with drugs and then build fortunes destroying the lives of others. This is not what I came here to do.
>
> I fought for freedom, he would say, but not for the freedom of people to kill each other with reckless abandon; not for the freedom of children to have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and abandon them as if they don't amount to anything. I fought for people to have the right to work, but not have whole communities and people abandoned. This is not what I lived and died for.

After describing what his administration was doing to curb drugs and violence, the President concluded that the government alone could not do the job. The problem was caused by "the breakdown of the family, the community and the disappearance of jobs," and unless we "reach deep inside to the values, the spirit, the soul and the truth of human nature, none of the other things we seek to do will ever take us where we need to go."[4]

The English idea of "Victorian values" is both more and less comprehensive than the American "family values." More comprehensive because it includes the family as well as hard work, thrift, cleanliness, self-reliance, self-respect, neighborliness, patriotism. One reason why the discussion of family values has been so unsatisfactory in the United States is that it has been narrowly interpreted, focused almost entirely on such matters as illegitimacy, abortion, and homosexuality. It does not belittle these subjects to suggest that they can be better understood in the larger context of Victorian values—of character, conduct, and the social ethos.

The expression "Victorian values," however, has its own limitations, for it would seem to be time-bound and place-bound—and, critics might add, gender-bound, race-bound, class-bound, culture-bound, and whatever other flaws are now commonly assigned to the past in general and to the Victorian period in particular. Values identified with the England of a century and more ago may be thought to have little or no relevance to England today, still less to other parts of the world.

Mrs. Thatcher herself has given those values a more venerable and varied lineage. On one occasion she described them as "perennial values," on others as Christian, Judaic-Christian, Puritan, Methodist, or (for the benefit of a Scottish audience) Scottish-Tory values.[5] She might also have

credited them to Evangelicalism, which, together with Methodism, was the primary inspirer of the "moral reformation" movement that laid the groundwork for Victorian values. That movement emerged in England in the late eighteenth century, half a century before Queen Victoria came to the throne. It was in 1787 that George III issued a proclamation for the "Encouragement of Piety and Virtue, and for the Preventing and Punishing of Vice, Profaneness, and Immorality." A "society" was promptly established to carry out that directive, and others soon followed, dedicated to the "Preservation of Public Morals," the "Suppression of Public Lewdness," the "External Observance of the Lord's Day," and other such worthy causes.

It was not George III, however, who seemed to symbolize the new spirit as much as Mrs. Grundy, a character in a play in 1798, whose neighbors were wont to worry about "what will Mrs. Grundy say?"[6] And more important than Mrs. Grundy (who in the play was a figure of mockery) was Mr. Bowdler, a real person and a more considerable character, who assumed the self-appointed role of literary censor. The first volume of the "bowdlerized" *Family Shakespeare,* purged of sexual indelicacies, appeared in 1804, the last in 1818, after which Bowdler performed the same service for the Old Testament and Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (in the latter case, removing impious passages as well as indecent ones).

But there was another side to the moral reformation movement. In addition to societies for the promotion of piety and virtue, others were established for the relief of the poor and infirm—for destitute orphans and abandoned children, aged widows and penitent prostitutes, the deaf, dumb, blind, and otherwise incapacitated. And institutions were established as well—orphanages, hospitals, charity schools, and Sunday schools. The latter were primarily intended to provide religious instruction for working-class children, but

they had the incidental effect of teaching the children to read, so that long before the institution of free public education in 1870, there was a remarkably high degree of literacy among the poor. The idea of moral reformation also extended to such humanitarian causes as the elimination of flogging in the army and navy, the abolition of the pillory and public whipping, the prohibition of cockfighting, bullbaiting, and bearbaiting, and, most important, the abolition of the slave trade.

The censorial spirit was much abated in the course of the nineteenth century. Although the *Family Shakespeare* continued to be reprinted, "bowdlerization," like "Mrs. Grundy," became a term of ridicule. At the same time, humanitarian and social reforms were pursued with a new fervor under the combined aegis of Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism. Motivated by different impulses and philosophies, religious and secular reformers collaborated in the passage of such measures as mine and factory acts limiting working hours, sanitation and health reforms, housing acts, public education, penal reforms, and civic amenities (libraries, parks, bathhouses, street-cleaning, street-lighting). Less formally, but no less effectively, they promoted those manners and morals that have come to be known as "Victorian values." As Evangelicalism was the primary bearer of those values among the middle classes, so Methodism was among the working classes. And as religion became more attenuated for many Englishmen, the values themselves became secularized, divorced from their religious roots but acquiring a sanctity of their own. The "moral reformation" initiated in the late eighteenth century came to fruition in the late nineteenth century.

There is a larger context, however, in which both Victorian values and family values have to be understood. Mrs.

Thatcher was reported as describing the values taught her by her grandmother as "Victorian values." But her Victorian grandmother would not have spoken of them as "values"; she would have called them "virtues."* Moreover, they were not, as it happened, "perennial" virtues. They were surely not the virtues of the classical philosophers.

The "cardinal" virtues celebrated by Aristotle were wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage; associated with these were prudence, magnanimity, munificence, liberality, gentleness. None of these appears in the litany of Mrs. Thatcher's grandmother. Nor were her virtues Aristotle's (although some of them might be subsumed under his categories). Certainly family values do not figure among the classical virtues. Plato, of course, would have utterly rejected them, as he rejected the very idea of the family; his ideal state of "communism" was a community that shared not only property but women and children as well. Even Aristotle, who repudiated Plato's view of the family, did not go so far as to elevate what we would regard as family values to the rank of virtues. Although he did recognize the natural "bonds of union" between husband and wife, parent and child, and gave the family the distinction of being "the first community" and therefore a natural part of the state, he was more solicitous of the family for the sake of a properly ordered state than for the sake of the family itself.[7] The only specific family value he singled out for commendation was household management, which dealt primarily with the finances and property of the family.

This is not to say that the Victorians would have spurned any of the classical virtues. On the contrary, they would

* In her autobiography, Mrs. Thatcher says that she originally used the expression "Victorian virtues." Although most accounts at the time rendered this as "Victorian values," at least one did give it as "Victorian virtues."[8]

have approved of them. If they did not assign to some of them (munificence, perhaps, or magnanimity) a high priority, it was because they would not have thought them the most essential and urgent virtues for most people in their own times. They may even have thought them more appropriate to a heroic, aristocratic age than to a bourgeois, democratic one.

Long before the advent of that bourgeois, democratic era, those classical virtues had been supplemented or displaced by the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity—the latter in its original meaning of the love of God. Where Aquinas saw these religious virtues as complementing the classical ones, Augustine saw them as irreconcilable, virtues that have no reference to God being "rather vices than virtues."[9] Later secular philosophers, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, subverted the classical virtues more subtly, and the Christian ones more radically. But all of them insisted upon the importance of virtues not only for the good life of individuals but for the well-being of society and the state. And all of them believed in the intimate relation between the character of the people and the health of the polity. Even those philosophers like Montesquieu who assigned different virtues to different regimes, and different *mœurs* to different societies, did not denigrate or deny the idea of virtue itself.

It was not until the present century that morality became so thoroughly relativized and subjectified that virtues ceased to be "virtues" and became "values." This transmutation is the great philosophical revolution of modernity, no less momentous than the earlier revolt of the "Moderns" against the "Ancients"—modern science and learning against classical philosophy. Yet unlike the earlier rebels, who were fully conscious of the import of their rebellion, the later

ones (with the notable exception of Nietzsche) seemed almost unaware of what they were doing. There was no "Battle of the Books" to sound the alarm and rally the troops. Even the new vocabulary, which was so radical a departure from the old and which in itself constituted a revolution in thought, passed without notice.

This is all the more curious because the inspirer of the revolution and the creator of the new language was acutely aware of the significance of it all. It was in the 1880s that Friedrich Nietzsche began to speak of "values" in its present sense—not as a verb, meaning to value or esteem something; nor as a singular noun, meaning the measure of a thing (the economic value of money, labor, or property); but in the plural, connoting the moral beliefs and attitudes of a society. Moreover, he used the word consciously, repeatedly, indeed insistently, to signify what he took to be the most profound event in human history. His "transvaluation of values" was to be the final, ultimate revolution, a revolution against both the classical virtues and the Judaic-Christian ones. The "death of God" would mean the death of morality and the death of truth—above all, the truth of any morality. There would be no good and evil, no virtue and vice. There would be only "values." And having degraded virtues into values, Nietzsche proceeded to de-value and trans-value them, to create a new set of values for his "new man."

When, early in the twentieth century, shortly after Nietzsche's death, the sociologist Max Weber borrowed the word "values," he had no such nihilistic intentions, which is perhaps why he did not comment on the novelty of the term, still less attribute it to Nietzsche.* Instead he used the word

* Although Weber rarely referred to Nietzsche in his published work, and such references as there are are generally critical, there is no doubt that he read him and was much influenced by him.

matter-of-factly, as if it were part of the accepted vocabulary and of no great moment. For that reason, because it seemed so familiar and unthreatening, it was all the more effective, for it was absorbed unconsciously and without resistance into the ethos of modern society, as it was absorbed into the vocabulary. "Values" brought with it the assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and relative, that they are mere customs and conventions, that they have a purely instrumental, utilitarian purpose, and that they are peculiar to specific individuals and societies. (And, in the current intellectual climate, to specific classes, races, and sexes.)

So long as morality was couched in the language of "virtue," it had a firm, resolute character. The older philosophers might argue about the source of virtues, the kinds and relative importance of virtues, the relation between moral and intellectual virtues or classical and religious ones, or the bearing of private virtues upon public ones. They might even "relativize" and "historicize" virtues by recognizing that different virtues characterized different peoples at different times and places. But for a particular people at a particular time, the word "virtue" carried with it a sense of gravity and authority, as "values" does not.

Values, as we now understand that word, do not have to be virtues; they can be beliefs, opinions, attitudes, feelings,

Toward the end of his life he is said to have told a student:

> Today a scholar's honesty, and especially that of a philosopher, can be measured by his attitude toward Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever does not admit that he could not have accomplished crucial parts of his own work without the contributions of these two men deceives himself and others. Our intellectual universe has largely been formed by Marx and Nietzsche.[10]

habits, conventions, preferences, prejudices, even idiosyncrasies—whatever any individual, group, or society happens to value, at any time, for any reason. One cannot say of virtues, as one can of values, that anyone's virtues are as good as anyone else's, or that everyone has a right to his own virtues. Only values can lay that claim to moral equality and neutrality. This impartial, "nonjudgmental," as we now say, sense of values—values as "value-free"—is now so firmly entrenched in the popular vocabulary and sensibility that one can hardly imagine a time without it.*

To speak of Victorian values (as I occasionally do in the course of this book, out of deference to common usage) is not merely a semantical anachronism; it is a distortion of the Victorian ethos. The Victorian virtues were neither the classical nor the Christian virtues; they were more domesticated than the former and more secular than the latter. But they were "virtues" as the Victorians understood the word—not "values" in our sense. Most Victorians even believed them to be, as Margaret Thatcher did, "perennial virtues"—and if not literally perennial, then, for their own time and place at least, sufficiently fixed and certain to have the practical status of "perennial."

For the Victorians, these virtues were fixed and certain, not in the sense of governing the actual behavior of all people all the time (or even, it may be, of most people most

* The "values clarification" technique currently used in "moral education" courses typifies the new mode of thinking. The teacher in such a course is enjoined from any pronouncement that might intimate that something is right or wrong. Instead the students are assigned the task of discovering their own values by exploring their likes and dislikes, preferences and feelings.[11] (See "On the Usage of 'Values,' " following this Prologue, pp. 19–20.)

of the time). Plato and Aristotle did not assume that of their virtues; nor did Augustine and Aquinas of theirs. But all of them did believe that they were the standards against which behavior could and should be measured. The standards were firm even if the behavior of individuals did not always measure up to them. And when conduct fell short of those standards, it was judged in moral terms, as bad, wrong, or evil—not, as is more often the case today, as misguided, undesirable, or (the most recent corruption of our moral vocabulary) "inappropriate."

This is why so much of the discussion of Victorian values has been beside the point. In his rebuttal to Margaret Thatcher, Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, asserted: "The 'Victorian Values' that ruled were cruelty, misery, drudgery, squalor, and ignorance."[12] But this is to confuse moral values with the social realities of Victorian life (or what Kinnock took to be such); surely no Victorian, however hardheaded or mean-spirited, espoused cruelty, misery, etc., as "values," as things to be desired or advocated. The historian who disputes the idea of Victorian values by pointing to the "educated elite"—Dickens, Trollope, Morris, Ruskin, Carlyle, Arnold—who criticized the "vulgarity, philistinism and intolerance" of their time is unwittingly confirming the very idea of Victorian values.[13] For these eminent Victorians were preeminently moralists, rebuking those who strayed from the path of virtue by committing those all too common sins of vulgarity, philistinism, and intolerance. Carlyle is the archetype of the Victorian moralist, celebrating precisely the virtues—work, discipline, thrift, self-help, self-discipline—associated with Victorian values.

Similarly, Dickens's novels, so far from refuting the idea of Victorian values, actually reinforce it. Those who cite some of his more memorable characters (Fagin or Bill Sikes) as evidence of an amoral or immoral "underclass" (another

anachronistic word—"dangerous class," the Victorians would have said) miss Dickens's point, which was precisely to contrast these "low" characters to those among the very poor who made a determined effort to be moral, law-abiding, and self-supporting. If we remember Dickens for his gothic characters and scenes, we should also remember him for those other characters and scenes that meant so much to him and his readers, and that perfectly embody what we now think of as Victorian values: Mrs. Nubbles, the widowed washerwoman who managed to provide sustenance for her three children in a home that was extremely poor but had the "air of comfort about it" that comes with "cleanliness and order"; or the Cratchits in their threadbare but "darned up and brushed" clothes gathered around the hearth for their meager but joyous Christmas "feast."[14]

It is not enough, in short, for the critics of Victorian values to argue that many Victorians often violated those values—that not all, perhaps not most, washerwomen were as clean, orderly, hardworking, and devoted to her children as Mrs. Nubbles; or that the Cratchits represented an idealized family in an idyllic setting of hearth and home; or that Mrs. Thatcher's grandmother may have been an untypical specimen of her generation. What the critics would have to argue is that many or most Victorians did not accept those values *as their values,* whatever their actual behavior. And that is a much harder case to prove. It is important for historians to try to take the measure of social behavior as against moral principles, to estimate the degree to which particular groups and classes at particular times and places observed or transgressed those principles. But it is no less important to recognize (as more and more historians are beginning to do) the reality and the power of the principles themselves—the belief in family and home, respectability and character. Values remain values (all the more if they are

thought of, as they were by the Victorians, as "virtues" rather than "values"), even if they are not always carried out in practice. They are what people aspire to, knowing that they will never be fully realized.

The shift from "virtue" to "values" has had other unfortunate consequences. Having displaced virtue from the central position it once occupied, as the defining attribute of the good life and the good society, we have relegated it to the bedroom and boudoir. When we now speak of virtue, we no longer think of the classical virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage, or the Christian ones of faith, hope, and charity, or even such Victorian ones as work, thrift, cleanliness, and self-reliance. Virtue is now understood in its sexual connotations of chastity and marital fidelity. One of the great mysteries of Western thought, the philosopher Leo Strauss has said, is "how a word which used to mean the manliness of man has come to mean the chastity of women."[15]

This mutation in the word "virtue" has the effect first of narrowing the meaning of the word, reducing it to a matter of sexuality; and then of belittling and disparaging the sexual virtues themselves. These virtues, chastity and fidelity, have been further trivialized by the popular conception of Victorianism as obsessively puritanical. "Victorian values" conjures up images of piano legs modestly sheathed in pantaloons, table legs (as well as human legs) referred to as "limbs," and books by men and women authors dwelling chastely on separate shelves in country-house libraries—all of which are thought to exemplify the repressive, inhibited view of sexuality that is presumed to be typically Victorian. In fact, these and other niceties of taste were not the normal (or even abnormal) practices of real Victorians but as often as not the inventions of satirists, foisted by the English on

gullible Americans and perpetuated by unwary historians.* "The woman who draped the legs of her piano," one historian soberly informs us, "so far from concealing her conscious and unconscious exhibitionism, ended by sexualising the piano; no mean feat."[16] It is the historian, however, who has sexualized the piano and imposed his own sexual fantasies upon the Victorians.

One of the many ironies in the current debate about family values and Victorian values is that the word "values" has taken on something of the connotation of the older "virtues." In a thoroughly relativistic climate such as our own, even "values" may come to be seen as a retreat from relativism and a reassertion of moral principles. Critics complain that the invocation of values is an appeal to moral absolutism, an attempt to restore an obsolete and coercive morality. Others, rebutting that charge, see it as a way of counteracting a moral relativism that threatens to degenerate into nihilism, an effort to recover a modest degree of a not so remote ethos.† James Q. Wilson suggests that hidden behind the present usage of "values" is the idea of a "moral sense," so that "values" has become a code word for "virtues."[18]

* The covered piano legs originated with a traveler to America—not England—who reported seeing in a girls' school a piano dressed in "modest little trousers with frills at the bottom of them." And the sexual segregation of books appeared in a tract issued by a religious society informing the "perfect hostess" that "their proximity, unless they happen to be married, should not be tolerated."[17] These and similar pruderies, fancied or real, provided writers in *Punch* with endless occasions for satire.

† "Victorian" sounds positively ancient today—and so it must be to a generation that finds anyone over the age of thirty (or is it now forty?) suspect. It may help put the generational gap in perspective to recall that not only Margaret Thatcher's grandmother but her father and mother as well were Victorians. The first prime minister to be born after the reign of Queen Victoria was Harold Wilson, elected in 1964.

Indeed, "virtues" itself is beginning to emerge as a respectable word, and not merely in its sexual connotation. In Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain,* one character comments on another, the philosopher Settembrini:

> What a vocabulary! and he uses the word virtue just like that, without the slightest embarrassment. What do you make of that? I've never taken the word in my mouth as long as I've lived; in school, when the book said, '*virtus,*' we always just said 'valour' or something like that. It certainly gave me a queer feeling in my inside, to hear him.[19]

One wonders whether the million purchasers of William Bennett's *The Book of Virtues* had to overcome their initial embarrassment in order to utter that word, or whether they comfortably lapsed into an older vocabulary that corresponds to their intuitive "moral sense." In any case, it is noteworthy that this anthology of moral tales remained near the top of the best-seller list in the United States for more than a year. Even more noteworthy, the virtues the book celebrates are such familiar Victorian ones as self-discipline, work, responsibility, perseverance, and honesty.[20] (Not cleanliness or chastity, but perhaps those will appear in a sequel.)

Having written two lengthy books on poverty in Victorian England, I am painfully aware of the difficulties and inequities in Victorian life, not only those arising out of poverty, but those associated with the early stages of industrialism and democracy—class distinctions, social prejudices, abuses of authority, constraints on personal liberty, restrictions and hindrances of all sorts. But I have also learned to be appreciative of those values that helped miti-

gate the harsh realities of life, inspiring a "moral reformation" that, in turn, stimulated a variety of social and humanitarian reforms. It was no small feat for England, in a period of massive social and economic changes, to attain a degree of civility and humaneness that was the envy of the rest of the world.

ON THE USAGE OF "VALUES"

It is odd that the *Oxford English Dictionary,* the generally accepted authority for the early usage of words, cites neither Nietzsche nor Weber as the source of "values." The word, in the plural, does not appear at all in the 1928 edition. In the 1986 supplement and in the new edition of 1989, the earliest citation is from William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (published in English in 1918), a work much influenced by Weber. A German-English dictionary of the 1940s still does not give "values," *Werte,* its present sense or recognize the distinctive meaning of the plural. Even the article on "Values" in the revised edition of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) ignores both Nietzsche and Weber. Yet Nietzsche's works were translated into English in the 1890s and acquired something of a notoriety in the circles of Havelock Ellis and George Bernard Shaw. And although Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* was not translated until 1920, the German version of 1904–5 had generated a good deal of interest and controversy in England long before. Weber himself was sufficiently well known in America to be invited to address the Congress of Arts and Science in Saint Louis in 1904; his paper was one of the highlights of the session.

It is also strange that although Weber's "fact-value" distinction

has generated a good deal of controversy, and although Weber himself professed to be dissatisfied with the meaning generally attached to "value-free" (*Wertfrei*), there has been little or no discussion of his use of "values" as distinct from "virtues." The editor of an English translation of one of Weber's works supplies many footnotes about the meaning and translation of German words, but does not footnote the word "values."[21] The index to another English translation has several references to "values" but only one to "virtues": "Virtues, in Chinese *Annals*."[22] Weber himself, in the *Sociology of Religion,* uses "virtues" only in the context of religious virtues.[23]

There are a few, but probably only a few, earlier usages of "values" in English, in the current sense, that escaped the *OED*. T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883) refers at one point to a "universe of values."[24] But this is an isolated use of the word. It appears in a chapter entitled "Virtue as the Common Good"; it is followed by a sentence dealing with the "impalpable virtues of the character and disposition"; and in the book as a whole (a very long book), the words "virtue" and "good" (but not "values") appear on almost every page.

I

Manners and Morals

"Manners and morals"—the expression is unmistakably Victorian. Not "manners" alone: Lord Chesterfield in the eighteenth century was fond of discoursing to his son on the supreme importance of manners, as distinct from morals. And not "morals" alone: philosophers had always taken this as their special province; some had made it so elevated a subject that it had little to do with anything as mundane as manners.

It was the Victorians who combined those words so that they came trippingly off the tongue, as if they were one word.[1] Yet in this, as in so much else, they were drawing on a long intellectual heritage. When William of Wykeham, bishop of Winchester and chancellor of England, founded New College, Oxford, in the late fourteenth century, he took as its motto "Manners Makyth the Man," meaning by manners something very nearly indistinguishable from morals. So too John Milton in the seventeenth century, when he defended freedom of the press except for "that which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or

NOTES

Complete bibliographical information for each reference appears in the first citation of that source in each chapter.

Prologue: From Virtues to Values

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21. Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers,* ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago, 1968).
22. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), p. 489.
23. Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion,* trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston, 1963 [1st Ger. ed., 1922]), pp. 164–65, 175, 177, 244.
24. Thomas Hill Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics,* ed. A. C. Bradley (New York, 1969 [1st ed., 1883]), p. 261.

Chapter I: Manners and Morals

1. In France, of course, they were one word: *"mœurs,"* as Montesquieu used it, meaning both morals and manners.
2. John Milton, *Areopagitica* (1644), in *The Prose of John Milton,* ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1968), p. 272.
3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), (Everyman ed., London, 1943), p. 49.